Executive report · Documented case
The collapse of the
whistleblower protection system
This report examines the real effectiveness of the whistleblower protection system when a judicially established illegality, committed by the Administration itself against public officials who had reported irregularities and sought institutional protection, results in no rectification, redress or effective institutional accountability.
Twenty years of documentary traceability make it possible to reconstruct the successive responses of Catalonia's various government, oversight and safeguard bodies and to document an institutional failure that continues to have effects today.
The report examines the actions of the Department of Justice, the Ombudsman (Síndic de Greuges), the Anti-Fraud Office of Catalonia, the Department of the Presidency, the Public Ethics Advisory Committee and, in part, the Parliament of Catalonia.
…a misuse of power is established, a misuse which, moreover, occurs within an inherently perverse situation, namely the widespread precarious employment status of the service's staff, their lack of job stability, and the resulting position of abnormal dominance held by the Administration.
Judgment No. 94/2008, Administrative Court No. 12 of Barcelona · 25 March 2008The institutional pattern
The judiciary establishes the misuse of power; the remaining institutions acknowledge or are aware of it, but none activates an effective remedy.
The executive report
An analysis of the systemic failure of the whistleblower protection system.
1. Purpose
This report documents a case in which a misuse of power against whistleblowers, within the Department of Justice of the Generalitat of Catalonia, was judicially established, but has not led to any institutional reparation over a period of twenty years.
The document analyses the subsequent response of oversight and guarantee institutions and shows how, despite the existence of an illegality judicially recognised, the institutional system does not activate the reparation mechanisms provided for under the legal framework on public integrity and whistleblower protection.
The purpose of the report is to document the pattern of institutional functioning that arises when an established misuse of power affects whistleblowers, and to provide this case as material for analysis
2. Verifiable objective elements
The file contains verifiable elements:
- Judicially established misuse of power, occurring in a situation described by the court as “inherently perverse” within the field of administrative law.
- Role reversal affecting the officials who reported irregularities or gave statements during the investigation, documented through an administrative resolution that attributed collusion in their statements and improper conduct to them, shifting the focus of the irregularities onto those who had reported or testified, while those institutionally responsible remained protected, normalised and later promoted.
- Explicit ethical doctrine of the Public Ethics Advisory Committee (CAEP) that deprives the misuse of power of any consequences
- Assumption by the Government: the Presidency refers to the CAEP opinion and declines to act.
- Absence of corrective action by the external oversight bodies, the Síndic de Greuges and the Anti-Fraud Office, despite the established illegality.
- Subsequent response of the Anti-Fraud Office of Catalonia, in July 2026, invoking lack of resources as a reason not to intervene, while proposing the possibility of using the case for training purposes in an activity on misuse of power and subsequent political appointments
- Subsequent practical application: appointments and practical normalisation.
3. The turning point: Opinion 1/2024 of the Public Ethics Advisory Committee (CAEP) as doctrine
The CAEP issues Opinion 1/2024, of 31 July 2025, the Government’s first ethical pronouncement on a misuse of power, and establishes a doctrinal criterion:
- it acknowledges the misuse of power,
- but asserts that it does not constitute an abuse of power, for ethical or institutional purposes.
- that it does not affect the integrity of those responsible,
- and that it does not preclude further appointments.
This criterion defines how ethics and public integrity are understood when there is a judicially established illegality.
4. Documented institutional pattern: chain of decisions
The institutional response follows a coherent and traceable pattern:
- Final judgment: misuse of power.
- Anti-Fraud Office (OAC): In previous actions, it assessed the case and the judicial decisions, without activating any corrective action or incorporating the judicial description “inherently perverse” as a central element. In July 2026, it invokes the existence of final judgments and lack of resources as reasons not to intervene, while proposing the use of the case for training purposes within the OAC itself.
- CAEP doctrine: no ethical, integrity or suitability consequences.
- Presidency / Government: adopts the CAEP criterion and declines to take any restorative justice action concerning the affected civil servants.
- Ombudsman (Síndic de Greuges): withdraws and closes the file without examining the substance.
- Subsequent application of the criterion: appointments and institutional normalisation.
This pattern shows what occurs when a misuse of power is judicially established and the system decides not to repair.
5. Institutional outcome: systemic failure of the whistleblower protection framework
The final outcome is not attributable to a single decision, but to the successive convergence of all oversight institutions, which recognise the illegality but refrain from activating the legal framework that requires them to repair its ongoing effects.
Where there is a judicially established misuse of power affecting officials who reported irregularities or gave statements during the investigation, none of the competent bodies, the Public Ethics Advisory Committee, the Presidency of the Government, the Síndic de Greuges or the Anti-Fraud Office, activates institutional reparation, reviews the ongoing effects or questions the suitability of those responsible.
The illegality is formally recognised, but becomes institutionally normalised, while protection and reparation for the whistleblowers are not activated and institutional responsibility is not deployed.
The response of the Anti-Fraud Office in 2026 confirms this pattern: the case is regarded as potentially useful as a teaching example concerning misuse of power and subsequent political appointments, but not as an institutional responsibility requiring redress. The difficulty of rectifying “a narrative constructed more than twenty years ago” is itself acknowledged, yet this does not translate into any effective mechanism for rectification.
This outcome is an example of systemic failure, since the precedent established is not an isolated error, but an operational criterion of the system when faced with judicially established misuses of power affecting whistleblowers.
Documentary chronology
Twenty years, document by document. Every entry is referenced to its original source.
Complete chronology: all 44 documented entries, each referenced to its original source.
Initial complaint of serious irregularities in the Occupational Risk Prevention Service of the Ministry of Justice.
Two officials from the Occupational Risk Prevention Service submit a complaint to the Minister and the Secretary General of Justice, Mr. Joan Turró Vicens, exposing organizational and functional irregularities affecting the service's operation and workers' health, in a context of structural staff precariousness and inhibition by the Deputy Director General of Human Resources, Ms. Elena Pérez Fernández. They expressly request institutional protection and corrective measures.
Two days later, nine prevention delegates representing the unions CATAC, CCOO, CGT, CSIF, STAJ, and UGT join the complaint.
They decide not to continue in the Health and Safety committees. They state they are aware of the unsustainable situation and request an investigation. The Secretary General orders an investigation, and more than 20 officials testify.
Resolution of the Secretary General (SG) of Justice, Mr. Joan Turró Vicens, derived from the investigation.
The Secretary General for Justice, Mr Joan Turró Vicens, acknowledges the poor organisation of the service, but accuses the staff of the Prevention Service, without providing any evidence, of collusion in their statements, an accusation that was never subject to challenge and did not result in any disciplinary proceedings and that had the effect of discrediting the civil servants who corroborated the initial complaint and of reversing the position of the whistleblowers or witnesses. This narrative, never institutionally rectified, has continued to have reputational and stigmatising effects to this day.Despite this, several civil servants were removed from their posts. While the trade unions CATAC and CCOO filed administrative appeals, they did not pursue judicial action. The whistleblowers, however, proceeded with legal action, and the majority of the Service's staff testified in court
Resolution of the Secretary-General (SG) for Justice, Mr. Joan Turró Vicens, for dismissal based on "Needs of service”.
Example of one of the removal from post: Resolution of the SG Mr. Joan Turró Vicens, upon the proposal of Ms. Elena Pérez Fernández, dismissing one of the whistleblowing officials on the grounds of "needs of the service". This rationale was subsequently deemed not credible by the court, which found a misuse of power.
Ombudsman (Síndic de Greuges). 1st Response.
The Catalan Ombudsman concludes that no irregular administrative action can be identified beyond the failure to respond to an appeal, and accepts the Department’s official account. This assessment is subsequently called into question by the judgments issued in 2008, 2010 and 2012.
New Resolution of the SG of Justice on the appeal regarding the dismissal for "needs of the service."
Resolution by the Secretary-General (SG) Mr. Joan Turró Vicens dismissing the administrative appeal and reiterating the argument of "needs of the service”, a rationale that the court would later deem not credible upon finding a misuse of power.
Dismissal of Mr. Joan Turró i Vicens as Secretary General of the Ministry of Justice.
DECREE 452/2006, of November 30, by the President of the Generalitat and the Minister of Justice.
Dismissal of Ms. Elena Pérez Fernández as Deputy Director General of HR of the Department of Justice.
RESOLUTION JUS/3524/2007, dated November 19, by the Minister of Justice. She is appointed Director of Labor Relations at the Barcelona City Council.
Final Judicial Sentence (Misuse of Power). Court No. 12 of Barcelona. SENTENCE No. 94/2008.
The Administrative Court No. 12 establishes a “misuse of power”. The judge concludes that “the stated justification of service needs is not credible, and a misuse of power is established, a misuse which, moreover, has an impact on a situation that is inherently perverse, namely the widespread precarious employment status of the service’s staff, their lack of job stability, and the resulting position of abnormal dominance held by the Administration.”
Ombudsman. 2nd Response.
The Ombudsman acknowledges the judicially established misuse of power, yet omits the expressions "inherently perverse" and "abnormal dominance," among others. He fails to activate any institutional review mechanisms or demand the rectification of the 2006 administrative resolution.
Ombudsman. 3rd Response.
The Ombudsman concludes that he perceives no arbitrariness in the Department of Justice's conduct. He refers to the Resolution of May 3, 2006, but completely omits the fact that the judgment found a misuse of power occurring within a situation described as “inherently perverse”. He refers the issue of corporate liability to the National Ombudsman (Defensor del Pueblo).
Ombudsman. 4th Response.
Despite the judicial finding of misuse of power, the Ombudsman refuses to reopen his proceedings and fails to examine either the responsibilities or the institutional impact derived therefrom. He omits the description "inherently perverse".
Parliament of Catalonia. Publication of the NARI* (Anti-Fraud Office Regulations).
The Parliament of Catalonia approves and publishes the NARI (Internal Action Regulations), which regulate the Anti-Fraud Office of Catalonia (OAC) duties regarding the protection of whistleblowers against retaliations and illegal dismissals. It establishes the obligation to promote corrective and restorative actions whenever the OAC becomes aware of such cases.
Final Court Judgment. Social Chamber (Occupational Accident). STSJ CAT 6177/2010. First conviction against the Department of Justice.
The TSJC condemns the Ministry of Justice for a work accident, specifically valuing the 2008 misuse of power sentence.
Archive of the Anti-Fraud Office (OAC). 1st Archive. Failure to apply NARI*.
The OAC does not initiate an investigation and shelves the case: a) It replaces the concept of "misuse of power" with an analysis focused merely on a "lack of motivation," omitting the judicial description of "inherently perverse." b) It claims that no violations regarding occupational health and safety had been reported, despite the existence of ongoing proceedings that would subsequently lead to two convictions against the Department. It fails to apply the NARI regulations that mandated its intervention.
Presidency of the Generalitat. Office of the President.
The Presidency acknowledges receipt of the communication and formally refers the matter to the Department of Justice (Human Resources) for evaluation and appropriate action. There is no record of any subsequent response or resolution on the merits.
Final Court Judgment. Social Chamber (Infringement of Occupational Risk Prevention). STSJ CAT 6510/2012. Second conviction against the Department of Justice.
The High Court of Justice of Catalonia (TSJC) orders the Department of Justice to pay a benefit surcharge (recargo de prestaciones) for infringing occupational risk prevention regulations within the same Prevention Service.
Parliamentary Questions (ERC). No response.
The ERC Parliamentary Group registered a series of questions to the Government at the Parliament's Bureau regarding the possible review of the 2006 Resolution and the measures to restore the honor of the affected officials. The need to initiate an investigation to clarify responsibilities was raised. These questions were never answered.
Presidency of the Generalitat. Office of the President.
The Presidency acknowledges receipt of the request to restore professional dignity following three favorable court rulings and expresses "full confidence" in the actions of the Department of Justice, without adopting any decision or promoting any administrative review. There is no record of any subsequent action.
Archive of the Anti-Fraud Office (OAC). 2nd Archive. Failure to apply NARI*.
The Anti-Fraud Office (OAC) shelves the case: despite acknowledging the illegality of the dismissal due to misuse of power and the subsequent judicial convictions, it omits the judicial description "inherently perverse". It rules out the existence of retaliations, failing to incorporate the elements highlighted by the judge regarding the temporal coincidence between the whistleblowing, the resolution of the internal investigation, and the dismissal, as well as lack of credibility of the stated rationale.
LAW 19/2014, of 29 December, on transparency, access to public information and good governance.
The law passed by the Parliament is published in the Official Gazette of the Government of Catalonia.
Archive of the Anti-Fraud Office (OAC). 3rd Archive. Failure to apply NARI*.
The OAC refuses to reopen actions, claiming no new circumstances, ignoring recommendations from the National Ombudsman (Defensor del Pueblo) and Members of Parliament.
Law 2/2023** of 20 February, regulating the protection of persons who report regulatory infringements and the fight against corruption.
Passed by the Spanish Parliament and published in the Official State Gazette (BOE)
Appointment of Ms. Elena Pérez Fernández, returning to the same institutional sphere linked to the judicially established facts.
DECREE 166/2024, dated August 27, by the President of the Generalitat and the Minister of Justice: She is appointed Secretary General for Criminal Measures, Reintegration, and Victim Support of the Department of Justice. She becomes the top official responsible for some of the civil servants affected by the original case.
Objection to Ms. Pérez's Appointment. Non-compliance with Law 19/2014; lack of suitability (1st Writing without response).
The President's Cabinet acknowledges receipt and states that procedures for its consideration will be carried out. No response has ever been received.
Appointment of Mr. Joan Turró Vicens returning to the institutional sphere of the Generalitat.
RESOLUTION PRE/3921/2024 by the Minister of the Presidency. Mr. Joan Turró Vicens is appointed as a member of the Commission of Experts for the Transformation of the Administration (CETRA) to lead the project on professional public management.
Reconsideration of Mr. Turró's Appointment. Non-compliance with Law 19/2014; lack of suitability (2nd Writing without response).
The President's Cabinet acknowledges receipt of the request for reconsideration and states that procedures for its consideration and management will be carried out. No response has ever been provided.
External Interference by the Deputy Director General of Legal Advice of Presidency in the Public Ethics Advisory Committee (CAEP).
The Deputy Director General for Legal Advice of the Presidency, who is not a member of the Ethics Committee (CAEP), intervenes in the proceedings without being part of the body or having functional competence, and provides advance indications to the Committee. This communication was erroneously copied to the affected individual.
Appeal for Reversal of Mr. Turró's appointment. Non-compliance with Law 19/2014 (3rd Writing without response).
An administrative appeal (recurso de reposición) against the appointment of Mr. Joan Turró Vicens is officially registered. It has been "in process" for over a year. No response has been provided.
Archive of the Anti-Fraud Office (OAC). 4th Archive. Admission of potential institutional risk. Neither applies the NARI* nor examines the current effects under the existing whistleblower protection framework**
The Anti-Fraud Office (OAC) declares the complaint inadmissible (2024) regarding the appointments, considering the facts to predate Law 19/2014. However, it refers the case to the Prevention Directorate upon recognizing a potential risk to public integrity, without any measures being adopted to date.
Formal requirement from the Ombudsman to Presidency. 5th Response. Change of criteria.
The Ombudsman requests documentation on the case and demands that the Presidency respond to the formal submissions presented. He calls for institutional cooperation.
Formal requirement from the Ombudsman to Presidency. 6th Response.
The Ombudsman warns the Presidency of the repeated breach of the legal duty to respond and to provide the required information (Arts. 42.2 and 55, Law 24/2009). He warns that such conduct may constitute obstruction (Art. 61.2.a) and issues an urgent follow-up request, which remains unanswered.
Ombudsman opens the Restorative path. 7th Response.
The Ombudsman agrees to analyze the feasibility of a restorative process and requests the identification of the points of conflict that, according to the whistleblower, remain unresolved in relation to the events of 2006.
Opinion of the Public Ethics Advisory Committee (CAEP). 9 months later.
The Secretary of the Ethics Committee (CAEP) acknowledges the existence of a misuse of power but concludes that it does not constitute an "abuse of power," without providing a specific rationale to justify this distinction, and omits the judicial description "inherently perverse." The opinion was issued following prior external intervention by the Deputy Director General for Legal Advice of the Presidency, who is not a member of the Committee nor holds any functional competence in the procedure. No other members of the CAEP are recorded as participants in the opinion.
Two Petitions Admitted for Processing in the Parliament of Catalonia. Petitions Committee. File Nos: 126-00074/15 and 126-00076/15.
The Parliament of Catalonia admits two petitions for processing regarding: a) The lack of independence of the Public Ethics Advisory Committee (CAEP). b) The lack of protection for whistleblowers by the Anti-Fraud Office of Catalonia (OAC).
"It is declined." Presidency of the Generalitat.
The Chief of Staff, acting on behalf and under the instruction of the President, declines the restorative justice and reparation process, merely referring back to the CAEP Opinion 1/2024. No express or reasoned response is provided for the pending 2024 submissions or the Ombudsman’s requirements. The President’s Office implicitly adopts the CAEP's criterion, whereby the judicially established misuse of power does not generate institutional consequences for the purposes of review, reparation, or assessment of suitability for holding new public responsibilities.
Appointment of Mr. Joan Turró Vicens as President of the Consorci Hospitalari de Vic.
New institutional appointment. https://govern.cat/salapremsa/audiovisual/imatge/2/577794
Closing of the Ombudsman's file, based on the Government's refusal to participate in restorative justice.
The closure culminates the institutional chain formed by the CAEP Opinion, the Government’s adoption of that position and the conclusion of the Ombudsman’s intervention. The practical outcome is that a judicially established misuse of power results in no effective institutional rectification or reparation. This marks the definitive transition from an individual case to an institutional case.
New Petition Admitted for Processing in the Parliament of Catalonia. Petitions Committee. File No: 126-00095/15.
The Extended Bureau admits for processing the petition regarding the systemic failure of the whistleblower protection system and opens a one-month period for public endorsements.
20th Anniversary of the Initial Complaint (07/03/2006)
The executive report is sent to the Catalan Anti-Fraud Office, addressed to whistleblowers and protection networks, journalists and researchers, legal scholars and academics, as well as national and European oversight institutions, together with this chronology.
Síndic de Greuges
The Catalan Ombudsman once again communicates the definitive closure of the proceedings in case file Q-00595/2025 and states that its intervention has come to an end.
Meeting with the Director of the Catalan Anti-Fraud Office (OAC), at his request
The need to rectify the institutional narrative arising from the resolution of 3 May 2006 is set out, given that it continues to produce reputational, professional and institutional effects. In the subsequent email exchange, the Director of the OAC invokes a lack of resources as a reason not to intervene, acknowledges the difficulty of rectifying “a narrative built more than twenty years ago” and, at the same time, proposes the possibility of using the case for training purposes on misuse of power and subsequent political appointments within the OAC itself.
The email exchange with the Director of the OAC is communicated to the Institutional Affairs Committee (CAI)
The email thread is forwarded to the CAI so that it may assess whether the response received calls for follow-up, a request for explanations or any other relevant parliamentary initiative. Awaiting response.
Complaint filed with the Defensor del Pueblo (Spanish national Ombudsman)
A complaint is submitted concerning the response of the Presidency of the Generalitat of 28/11/2025, which declined to lead a restorative justice and institutional reparation process in line with the opinion of the CAEP (Public Ethics Advisory Committee). The Ombudsman is asked to examine whether that response was sufficient and consistent, and whether it is compatible with the principles of good administration, good governance, public ethics and institutional integrity. Awaiting reply.
*NARI: 09/12/2009, DOGC (Official Gazette of Catalonia) No. 5522. Parliament of Catalonia. Internal Action Regulations of the Anti-Fraud Office of Catalonia. The NARI (arts. 25.2, 30 and 31) establish obligations to restore and correct the effects arising from established retaliation or unlawful dismissals.
Art. 25.2: If the Anti-Fraud Office becomes aware that a whistleblower or informant has been subjected, directly or indirectly, to acts of intimidation or retaliation — such as being unjustifiably and unlawfully removed, dismissed, held back from professional promotion, suspended, transferred, reassigned or stripped of duties, subjected to disciplinary proceedings, negative appraisals or reports, deprived of benefits otherwise due, or any other form of punishment, sanction or discrimination for having filed the complaint or report — the Office's director must pursue or exercise before the competent authorities the corrective or restorative actions required, recording this in all cases in the annual report.
** Law 2/2023 of 20 February, regulating the protection of persons who report regulatory infringements and the fight against corruption. Its citation in this chronology is not intended to attribute retroactive effects to the 2006 events, but rather to point out the need to examine, under the current legal framework, the actions, omissions or harms produced after its entry into force — including the persistence of the institutional, documentary and reputational effects arising from the Resolution of 3 May 2006, which has not been rectified.
Key documents
Literal excerpts from the primary sources underpinning the case.
“Furthermore, it must be expressly stated here… that from the statements of the staff of the Prevention Service there emerged evidence of indications given from some witnesses to others so that they would reiterate certain contents of their statements.”
“The stated justification of service needs is not credible, and a misuse of power is established, a misuse which, moreover, occurs within an inherently perverse situation…”
“There is no reason to initiate actions to restore the honour and dignity… more than 15 years ago.”
“There is no abuse of power, nor can… the classification of persons lacking integrity be attributed. In fact, the court rulings do not identify any personal responsibility.”
“In the name of the Most Honourable President of the Generalitat de Catalunya and by his direction… regarding your request that a restorative justice process be led… in accordance with the response issued by the Public Ethics Advisory Committee (Opinion 1/2024), your request is declined.”
“We consider that, in a matter that is before the courts and subject to a final judgment, the Office should not intervene. And indeed, we know how difficult it is for administrations to rectify a narrative built more than twenty years ago.”
The same email also offers the possibility of using the case for teaching purposes on misuse of power and subsequent political appointments within the OAC itself.
The central contradiction
The Public Ethics Advisory Committee acknowledges the misuse of power. Then it denies it any consequence.
“The judgments establish the existence of a misuse of power in a case file…”
“…yet there is no abuse of power, nor can… the classification of persons lacking integrity be attributed.”
If facts of this nature, judicially described in such grave terms, carry no consequences for public integrity, what kind of conduct would?
Key questions
Direct answers to the most common objections raised about the case.
No. This document does not seek to reopen any judicial proceedings or to challenge final judgments.
It starts precisely from what has already been judicially established: a proven misuse of power and a situation described as “inherently perverse” in relation to the civil servants affected. The issue is not to reopen matters that the courts have already decided, but to analyse what the institutional system did afterwards in response to that unlawfulness.
The central point is that a favourable judicial ruling can be deprived of practical effect if the Administration fails to rectify the institutional narrative that provided cover for the retaliations: the Resolution of the Secretary General for Justice of 3 May 2006, which discredited the civil servants affected and reversed the meaning of the initial report of irregularities.
Because the issue is not only what happened in 2006, but also what has not happened since: the original institutional narrative has not been rectified and its effects have not been remedied.
The continuing relevance of the case is confirmed by subsequent decisions and developments: the failure to rectify the narrative, the absence of institutional redress, the normalisation of those responsible, government appointments in 2024 and 2026, and the refusal of safeguard bodies to intervene in relation to the case’s current effects.
It is therefore not an old or closed dispute. It is a case with present-day effects, because the narrative that singled out the civil servants who reported the irregularities or gave evidence remains without institutional rectification.
Because the Resolution of the Secretary General for Justice of 3 May 2006, although acknowledging the poor organisation of the Prevention Service, shifted the focus away from the irregularities reported and towards the civil servants who had raised concerns about that situation or had given evidence during the investigation.
That Resolution attributed improper conduct and collusion in their statements to the civil servants of the Prevention Service. In doing so, it reversed the roles: the civil servants who had reported the irregularities or given evidence were portrayed as responsible for the conflict, while those bearing institutional responsibility were protected or normalised.
This point is essential because the subsequent harm stems not only from the removal from office that was annulled by the courts, but also from the institutional narrative that preceded and justified that removal and has remained unrectified for twenty years.
The courts established a clear judicial framework: the removal from office of one of the civil servants who had reported the irregularities constituted a misuse of power; the justification invoked by the Administration was not credible; and the removal was linked to the outcome of the investigation formalised in the Resolution of the Secretary General for Justice of 3 May 2006.
The judgment did not merely identify a formal illegality. It established that the misuse of power occurred “within an inherently perverse situation”, characterised by “the widespread precarious employment status of the service’s staff, the lack of stability and the resulting position of abnormal dominance held by the Administration”. This expression is central because it shows that this was not simply an administrative defect, but an institutionally serious situation.
Furthermore, subsequent judgments in the social jurisdiction ruled against the Department of Justice in relation to an occupational accident and a breach of occupational risk-prevention regulations arising from the same institutional context. The case therefore combines misuse of power, a judicial assessment of institutional seriousness and subsequent judgments against the Department of Justice.
Because taking into account the judicial description of the situation as “inherently perverse”, together with the context of “abnormal dominance” over the civil servants of the Prevention Service, would have prevented the case from being treated as a mere administrative irregularity, a failure to provide adequate reasoning or an employment dispute that had already been closed.
This omission altered the institutional reading of the case: it reduced its seriousness, obscured the fact that the civil servants who reported the irregularities or gave evidence had ultimately been portrayed as responsible, and allowed what the courts had placed on a much more serious level to be presented as a simple administrative episode.
On the basis of this diminished interpretation, the safeguard bodies opted for closure, inadmissibility, referral or dismissal, without activating any effective mechanism for correction, restoration or redress. The result was to turn a judicially established illegality into an institutionally unresolved situation.
What makes this case distinctive is the complete documentary traceability of the subsequent institutional pattern. This is even more significant because the events occurred within the Department of Justice itself.
A number of unusual elements are present cumulatively: civil servants who reported irregularities or gave evidence being singled out in an administrative resolution; a judgment identifying an institutionally serious situation; subsequent judgments against the Department of Justice; failure to rectify the original narrative; and absence of institutional redress.
This distinctiveness explains why even the Director of the Anti-Fraud Office of Catalonia (OAC) proposed the possibility of using the case for educational purposes in relation to misuse of power and subsequent political appointments. But this educational value cannot substitute for institutional rectification of the original narrative or redress for the effects produced. On the contrary, it confirms that the case has an institutional significance that also requires it to be addressed in terms of safeguards, redress and non-repetition.
First, institutional rectification of the original narrative constructed through the Resolution of the Secretary General for Justice of 3 May 2006, which discredited the civil servants who reported the irregularities or gave evidence and reversed the meaning of the initial report.
Recognition of the effects suffered by the civil servants concerned is also requested, together with the adoption of institutional redress measures within the respective remit of each institution.
Finally, it is requested that the consequences of this unrectified narrative be assessed in relation to the subsequent normalisation of those responsible and their suitability to assume new public responsibilities, and that safeguards be established to prevent a situation of this nature from recurring.
The critical issue is this contradiction: the CAEP acknowledges a judicially established misuse of power, but separates it from any effective consequence in terms of abuse of power, public integrity or institutional suitability.
This separation is particularly significant because, before the CAEP issued its formal response, there had already been a prior intervention by the Department of the Presidency establishing the underlying position: denying that there was any reason to restore the honour and dignity of the civil servants affected and denying that there had been any breach of good-governance standards.
The CAEP’s position subsequently served as the basis for the Presidency of the Generalitat to decline the restorative justice process proposed by the Síndic de Greuges. According to the communication received, this decision was taken following instructions from the President. After that decision, the Síndic brought its intervention to an end and closed the case, without any effective institutional rectification or redress having taken place.
In this way, the CAEP’s position ultimately validates that same stance: it formally acknowledges the misuse of power but denies it any consequences. The underlying question is:
If conduct of this nature, judicially characterised in such serious terms, has no consequences in terms of public integrity or suitability for public office, what kind of conduct would?
Because they reveal an institutional asymmetry that is difficult to justify: while the civil servants who reported the irregularities or gave evidence have received no institutional redress, those responsible for the narrative that discredited them have been normalised or appointed to new positions of public responsibility.
This issue does not involve imposing an indefinite sanction or automatically excluding any individual. It concerns a basic requirement of public integrity: before institutionally normalising careers linked to that narrative and to the context that gave rise to adverse judgments against the Department of Justice, the harmful narrative should have been rectified, the effects produced should have been acknowledged, and the suitability of the appointments should have been assessed.
The subsequent appointments are therefore not unrelated to the case: they demonstrate that the institutional narrative that discredited the civil servants has continued without rectification, without redress and without effective consequences for the institutional continuity of those responsible.
The institutional question that remains open is whether the system of safeguards for whistleblowers can be regarded as effective when, in the face of a judicially established illegality, an unrectified harmful institutional narrative, subsequent judgments against the Department of Justice and successive inaction by safeguard bodies, no genuine mechanism of redress is activated.
Parliament is not being asked to replace the courts or to resolve a specific administrative dispute. It is being asked to exercise its oversight function in response to an accumulated institutional failure: an official narrative that preceded and justified the retaliations, safeguard bodies that fail to act in relation to its current effects, and an Administration that does not assume the remedial consequences of the case.
The final question is unavoidable: if a case containing all these elements does not warrant parliamentary follow-up, a request for explanations, a hearing or some other oversight initiative, what case would?
Press coverage
Selection of external press coverage on the case. Headlines correspond to the outlets cited.
Full documentation available on request
Court judgments, administrative resolutions, official opinions and institutional correspondence — available in full to journalists, legal professionals and oversight institutions.
Request the full executive report in PDF —available in Catalan, Spanish and English— or get in touch for more information.
Note on the language version: This document corresponds to the English-language version, automatically translated from the original Catalan-language version. In the event of any discrepancy, contradiction or divergence in interpretation between the two versions, the Catalan version shall prevail.
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